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Research Note
Labor Reform in Brazil,
Politics, and Sindicatos:
Notes on the General
Strikes of 2017
Davide Carbonai
Abstract
On July 2017, Brazil’s Senate approved the country’s most extensive labor reform since
the emergent 1943’s Consolidation of Labor Law (Consolidac¸a˜o das Leis Trabalhistas,
CLT). The aforementioned reform provoked heated debates and its approval faced
resistance. Unions, for instance, convened two general strikes: the first, on April 2017,
garnered a significant amount of participation, while the latter, on June, ended with
participation falling significantly below expectations. Despite the widespread rejection of
Temer’s mandate and the content of the law, on June, unions were surprisingly unable to
agree on a common strategy regarding a proposal on labor reform. The present research
aims to explore this paradox. A survey-based analysis, along with a series of unstructured
interviews with union leaders and protesters, establishes a solid empirical base from
which to draw hypotheses about the Brazilian state corporatist union model and its
evolution.
Resumen
Em julho de 2017, o Senado brasileiro aprovou a reforma trabalhista mais ampla no paı´s,
desde o surgimento da Consolidac¸a˜o das Leis Trabalhistas de 1943 (CLT). A reforma
provocou acalorados debates e sua aprovac¸a˜o enfrentou resisteˆncias. Os sindicatos, por
exemplo, convocaram duas greves gerais: a primeira, em abril de 2017, obteve uma
quantidade significativa em termos de participac¸a˜o, enquanto a segunda, em junho,
terminou com a participac¸a˜o caindo significativamente abaixo das expectativas. Apesar
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da rejeic¸a˜o generalizada do governo Temer, a pro´pria a lei de reforma, em junho, os
sindicatos foram surpreendentemente incapazes de chegar a uma estrate´gia comum para
contrastar a aprovac¸a˜o da reforma. A presente pesquisa visa explorar este paradoxo por
meio de uma survey e uma se´rie de entrevistas na˜o estruturadas, com lı´deres sindicais e
manifestantes; as informac¸o˜es permitem estabelecer uma so´lida base empı´rica para
trac¸ar hipo´teses sobre o modelo sindical brasileiro e sua evoluc¸a˜o.
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Introduction
Sanctioned by President of Brazil, Michel Temer, in July 2017, the Law no. 13,467 alters
more than a hundred clauses in the Consolidation of Labor Law (CLT).1 The labor
reform provides a legal environment that reappraises collective negotiation (i.e. Articles
444and 510-A), deregulates the labor market (i.e. Articles 443 and 614), and modifies
the trade union funding system (i.e. Articles 545 and 883), thus representing a significant
and substantial novelty in the Brazilian labor relations system.
The 1943 model has a significant influence on the current Brazilian system of
industrial relations (Boito, 1991; Cardoso, 2010). In 1943, Getu´lio Vargas’s primary
objective in establishing the CLT under the Estado Novo was government control.
Thereafter, similar to the state corporatism model of industrial relations (Cook,
2007), Brazilian legislations allowed a significant degree of state oversight and
intervention (e.g. the compulsory ministry certification at the National Registry of
Trade Unions [Cadastro Nacional de Entidades Sindicais, CNES]). Moreover, until
2017, the government provided for direct subsidies to sindicatos through a variety of
mechanisms, such as union dues (the so-called imposto sindical).2 Because of the
imposto, Brazilian federal government subsidised sindicatos through the mandatory
deduction of one day of work per year for all workers, regardless of union mem-
bership. The principle of unicidade (the single-trade union rule and compulsory
representation), the professional sindicato per category and geographic zone, in
addition to the union dues, have established the basis of the Brazilian state cor-
poratism model over the years (Costa, 1986).
Brazil has never signed the eighty-seventh International Labor Organization con-
vention about Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Con-
vention. Due to the unicidade, competition among labor organisations – as well as the
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entry of new groups – is drastically limited (Cook, 2007: 18). Definitively, incentives for
mobilisation are generally scarce in the state corporatist system, and so too in the
Brazilian case (Mattos, 2009: 117–126). In fact, general strikes are quite rare in Brazil.
Apart from the general strike of 1917, such a form of union mobilisation regained
relevance only in the 1980s.
Worker dissatisfaction in Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s led to an increasing number of
protests during the military regime (Almeida, 1975), thus forming the left-oriented
Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in 1979 and the Unified Workers’
Central (Central U´nica dos Trabalhadores, CUT) in 1983. The most important general
strikes occurred in the 1980s as protest against the military regime: on 21 July 1983, the
general strike was attended by more than two million workers; on 12 December 1986,
approximately twenty-five million people joined the strike movement, representing
more than 40 per cent of labor force (this general strike was centred on economic
demands, such as the non-payment of external debt and the public policy of privatisa-
tions); on 14 and 15 March 1989, the new general strike mobilised approximately thirty-
five million workers (i.e. 70 per cent of the economically active population). Despite
their success in the 1980s, the number of strikes was dropped by half during the 1990s
and demands became fundamentally defensive (Boito et al., 2015). However, the last few
years mark a progressive escalation in both conflict and the number of strikes, culmi-
nating in a new cycle of union protests against Michel Temer’s labor reform (DIEESE,
2015; Marcelino, 2017).
This research discusses, in particular, the two general strikes of 2017 and attempts to
respond a paradox within the Brazilian union movement. Since the impeachment of
president Dilma in August 2016, and throughout 2017, the Brazilian trade union
movement has organised several protests and two general strikes: the first, which
occurred on April 2017, was a complete success, with significant participation; however,
the second, on June 2017, resulted in a glaring failure. Considered the success of the first
general strike in April, the increasing corruption scandals involving ministers within the
Temer government and its party (PMDB, Partido do Movimento Democra´tico Brasi-
leiro), the content of the labor reform (Krein, 2018), the second general strike on June
2017 was supposed to be a success. Once again, divisions among trade unions prevailed
over unitary mobilisation strategies and the divided trade unions failed to mobilise a
significant number of workers. Law No. 13,467 was therefore approved, as predicted. In
contrast, divisions among reform’s detractors were less predictable.
A mixed qualitative–quantitative approach was used to explain this paradox: a
reduced sample of semi-structured interviews collected on April and June 2017 and a
survey-based analysis (April 2017). A multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) tech-
nique has been used for the analysis of the survey data set. Moreover, the survey is used
to provide an overview of the general strike and some aspects of political opinion,
especially with regard to assessing the Temer government and its policy.
First, this article presents a brief introduction of the Temer government’s labor
reform; second, the research addresses the debate on general strikes by means of a
comprehensive sampling and series of unstructured interviews. Attitudes towards trade
unions and labor reform, mechanisms of mobilisation and its efficiency are analysed.
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The use of mixed strategies allows survey research to overcome some of their limitations
by incorporating the advantages of qualitative approaches. For example, the interviewer
interacts directly with the respondent, which produces more in-depth results from the
survey analysis. Finally, the conclusion discusses various perspectives and perils with
regard to Brazilian trade unionism.
Labor Reform and Politics
The entire process for the approval of law 13,467 was extremely quick and has never
been discussed with trade unions or institutional actors, such as the Fo´rum Nacional do
Trabalho (National Employment Forum).3 Labor reform arose from a right-wing
political milieu: those parties that voted the impeachment of Dilma in 2016 (the base
of the Temer government), the main employers’ associations (National Confederation of
Industry [CNI], National Confederation of Transport [CNT], etc.) and liberal-inspired
political groups Free Brazil Movement (MBL, Portuguese: Movimento Brasil Livre,
Vem pra rua, among others) – in other words, those political groups that organised the
protests against PT and Dilma in favour of the impeachment (Chequer and Butterfield,
2016).
Employers’ associations were very important in shaping the reform: at least one-third
of the approved amendments were decided by lobbyists from the main Brazilian
employers’ associations. Intercept Brazil (Magalha˜es et al., 2017) examined 850
amendments tabled by 82 deputies during the discussion of the bill in the special
commission on labor reform and discovered that 292 (34.3 per cent) of them were fully
written on computers belonging to representatives of the CNT, the National Con-
federation of Financial Institutions, the CNI, and the National Association of Freight
Transport and Logistics (NTC & Logistics).
Rights ensured to workers by the Brazilian Constitution, such as the minimum wage,
Christmas bonus salary, remunerated weekly rest and annual vacation, have been pre-
served, although the set of legislative devices introduced by the Reform weighs in favour
of employers’ associations rather than workers. The labor reform introduces the main
legal instruments of labor flexibility: amendments, which include the permission to hire
freelance workers (i.e. the creation of the so-called intermittent work; Articles 442–443),
the introduction of remote work (Article 75-A), reform of the legislative provisions
pertaining to part-time work (Article 58-A), flexibility of holidays (Article 134), higher
flexibility in labor relations at the firm level (Article 444), and dismissal (Article 477).4
The reform altered the system of collective negotiation and established the prevalence
of negotiated terms over the labor legislation. Law 13,467 grants more autonomy to
employees in negotiations with employers and more importance to the union-negotiated
collective conventions and bargaining agreements, which prevail over the law when
regulating working hours, work breaks, careers and salary plans, incentive awards and
profit sharing, among others (Article 611-A).
An issue that has created visible friction – and divisions – among trade unions con-
cerns the reform of the union funding system. In fact, labor reform removed the main
funding instrument of trade unions, the so-called imposto sindical. The payment of union
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dues by the employees, currently compulsory and deducted from salaries, shall become
optional (Article 579).
In addition, the reform introduced a set of dubious legal defects, spurring doubts about
its constitutionality among part of the judiciary. The first concrete demonstration of the
legal impasse occurred in Brasilia, on 9 and 10 October 2017 at the second Conference
on Material and Procedural Labor Law, promoted by the National Association of
Magistrates of Justice of Work (Anamatra). A total of 600 members, including judges,
prosecutors and labor auditors, as well as lawyers and other legal professionals, divided
into eight thematic committees, discussed more than 300 enunciados (proposals for
statements) on the law and approved 125, all in contrast to the auspices of the Reform.5
In all probability, the Law 13,467 will require careful interpretation of Labor magis-
trates, in the light of the Federal Brazilian Constitution and international conventions and
treaties. This is a delicate issue; one of the approved enunciados rejects the idea that
judges should only observe the literality of the law without interpreting it, compromising
the free conviction motivated by each Labor Judge, who is responsible for assessing any
disputes impartially and is technically apt to interpret the concrete will of the law, in the
light of constitutional legal bases.
According to Law 13,467/2017, Articles 8, §3, in the examination of collective
conventions and collective bargaining agreements, Brazilian Labor Courts will be
subjected to the principle of minimum intervention and, indeed, that is, will be solely
entitled to verify compliance with the essential labor rights. Other “enunciados” contrast
the intermittent day and 12  36 work cycle (rejecting the possibility of formalising the
12  36 cycle by individual agreement, according to Article 7, of the Federal Consti-
tution), along with the “legal fees” for the employee and outsourcing (in the field of
outsourcing, several theses were approved, such as the enunciado against outsourcing in
direct and indirect public administration) (Krein, 2018: 88–89).
Moreover, since the approval of Law No. 13,467, the number of Ac¸o˜es Diretas de
Inconstitucionalidade (direct actions of unconstitutionality) has multiplied, representing
a signal of the law’s unconstitutionality, and a general legal uncertainty. Later, the
Supreme Federal Court responded to numerous Ac¸o˜es Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade,
mainly driven by labor justice. For this, the provisional measure (“medida proviso´ria”)
808/2017 instituted by Temer’s government tried to anticipate and resolve doubts related
to labor justice, particularly those regarding intermittent work, the duration of the
working day, and the remuneration of extraordinary service. To come into effect, the
“medida proviso´ria” 808 had to be approved, but it was not. Furthermore, it is important
to consider that at the present moment, there is no rule for the intermittent worker (with
regard to sick pay, maternity wage, retirement contribution time, etc.).
Descriptive Statistics and Data Analysis
These provisions have sparked a heated debate among trade unions, with obvious
repercussions in terms of political mobilisation. To better understand the protests and
general strikes, a survey-based analysis by CUT/IPESA (2017) was conducted in April
2017 and included 1,503 randomly selected respondents. The survey was limited to Rio
Carbonai 235
Grande do Sul, the southernmost state of Brazil, and to a constituency of workers, jobless
people and retirees.6 The IPESA’s main results can be summarised as follows: (1) 62 per
cent of respondents declared themselves to be “against” the proposed labor reform; (2)
60 per cent reported being “in favour” of the general strike of April; (3) 72 per cent were
“in favour” of the protests against the Temer government. Broadly, there was widespread
opposition to the Temer government and an unexpected demonstration of support on
behalf of protest movements. On the other hand: (1) one of three interviewees ignored
the activity of the CUT (“I don’t know” [the CUT]); (2) on a scale from 0 to 10, the
average score for the referred trust in trade unions is rather low, at 4.2; (3) on the same
scale, the average for CUT is even lower than the overall average, at 3.9.7
A more in-depth analysis of part of the sample explains some additional details that
were not highlighted in the global descriptive analysis. First, strike support is inter-
classist: there are no significant differences between workers and employees (the w2
test is not significant; Table 1).
Nevertheless, to get a better data overview, instead of a set of bivariate analysis,
variables and their characters were subjected to an MCA. The MCA allows for a mul-
tivariate analysis and explores possible relationships among categorical variables
(Benze´cri, 1973; Greenacre, 2007). MCA is based on distance between both individuals
and all levels of all characters, in two respective representation spaces, so that the closer
the items are, the more similar they are. The planes are sought in order to maximise the
represented distance in a reduced dimensional space. Thus, MCA is merely exploratory;
that is, it shows possible relationships between characters without establishing cause and
effect among variables. Thereafter, a reduced sample was submitted to MCA, consid-
ering eight active variables and three illustrative variables.
The total inertia explained by these two factors is equal to 50.8 per cent, that is, the
first factor explains 30.6 per cent and the second explains 20.2 per cent. Only the first
two factors of MCA were considered because the others were too small to warrant
consideration. Characters are represented according to their correlation ratio with the
first two factors (the last two columns of Table 2). Variables 1, 2, and 3 are correlated
with the first factor. The second factor is related to all the items, although a little more to
Table 1. General strike and occupational status.a
Blue collar White collar Total
What is your opinion about the last
general strike?
Against 7 31 38
9.33% 10.92% 10.58%
I don’t know/I have
no idea
21 79 100
28.00% 27,82% 27.86%
In favour 47 174 221
62.67% 61.27% 61.56%
Total 75 284 359
100% 100% 100%
aPearson’s w2 ¼ 0.16.
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“trust in CUT.” Age, Occupational status, and Income are considered illustrative and do
not condition the two factors.8
Two nominal categories that are closely positioned in the factorial space (Figure 1)
indicate they are associated and covariate likewise in relation to the other nominal
categories; for example, “white collar” and “blue collar”, the cohorts of age “16–24” and
“45–59”, “high salaries” (code whigh), and lower (wlow), all these illustrative nominal
categories are grouped at the centre of the factorial space. Put another way, the strike is
an inter-class event and involves all cohort ages with the exception of the older ones.
Opinion “in favour” of social protests (1.c), opinion “in favour” of general strike (2.c),
“Yes” to join these protests against the government (3.c), and “against” the labor reform
Table 2. Nominal variables (active and illustrative), weight on dimensions 1 and 2.
% Labels 1 2
Active variables
[v1] What is your opinion regarding the
social protests against the Temer
government?
Against 9.5 1.a 0.64 0.18
I don’t know 18.2 1.b
In favour 72.3 1.c
[v2] What is your opinion about general
strike?
Against 10.5 2.a 0.56 0.12
I don’t know 28.4 2.b
In favour 61.1 2.c
[v3] Would you join these protests
against the government?
No (and “I don’t know”) 56.6 3.a 0.52 0.12
Yes, I would 43.4 3.c
[v4] What is your opinion about labor
reform?
Against (and “I don’t
know”)
73.5 4.a 0.22 0.03
In favour 26.5 4.c
[v5] What is the alternative to resolve the
political crisis?
“Indiretas” [no elections] 6.8 5.a 0.11 0.22
“Diretas” [new
presidential elections]
93.2 5.b
[v6] Trust in trade unions Low 45.3 6.a 0.16 0.3
High 54.7 6.b
[v7] Trust in CUT Low 45.4 7.a 0.12 0.34
High 54.6 7.b
[v8] What is your opinion about pension
reform?
Against (and “I don’t
know”)
88 8.a 0.08 0.27
In favour 12 8.c
Illustrative variables
[v9] Age 16–24 20.0 16–24
24–44 39.7 24–44
45–59 29.7 45–59
>59 10.5 >59
[v10] Occupational status Blue collar 21.1 blueC
White collar 78.9 whiteC
[v11] Income Lower than three
minimum wages
87.9 wlow
Over three 12.1 whigh
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(4.a) are grouped on the right side of the figure (quadrants I and IV). On the same side,
there are high trust in trade unions (6.b), high trust in CUT (7.b) and (3.c). It is note-
worthy that all these items in favour of the strike and against the Temer government are
grouped in the first quadrant.
Figure 1. Items and first two factors (MCA). MCA: multiple correspondence analysis.
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The Brazilian political spectrum is clearly divided. On the opposite side, in the third
quadrant, are items 5.a and 8.c (who does not want “direct election” and who is “in
favour of the pension reform”). Items against protest “1.a” and against the general strike
“2.a” appear in the second quadrant, far from the centre.
The MCA returns clear results: labor reform is harshly criticised by trade unions, an
inter-classist and inter-generation group in favour of the direct election of a new president,
which is more confident in CUT and others “centrais” and which is strongly critical of the
Temer government and its policies. In contrast, those groups that are in favour of reform
opposed to strikes and in favour of an indirect election of the new president.
What Is a General Strike For?
The interviews with protesters and union leaders, especially on the day of the first
general strike on April 28, confirm the analysis discussed above and introduce new
elements in the relationship among politics, social movements, and trade unions.
Since the narrow re-election of former president Dilma Rousseff on October 2014
until the impeachment (the so-called golpe), various right-wing activist groups have
sprung up across Brazil in protest of the government and in response to a massive
corruption scandal at the state-owned oil company Petrobras, thus encouraging the
growth of the anti–PT movements (i.e. the “antipetismo”; Paiva et al., 2016). As
unstructured interviews suggest, protests against labor reform also represent a counter-
attack against the authors of the “golpe,” the anti-PT movements, the employers’
associations, and the “international finance and its economic interests, the liberal and
ultra-conservative Brazilian right-wing” (Student B, 28 April 2017, personal interview).9
As suggested by the respondents:
[ . . . ] we are here against the golpista government, against the constitutional amendment
number 55 [ . . . ] The labor reform is unfair. And the pension reform is being drafted to be
approved in 2018. All that in a deeply inefficient tax system, which makes the poor spend
most of its income tax. (Local union leader, April 28 2017, personal interview)10
[ . . . ] Since 2016 there has been an illegitimate president, interested in the general destruc-
tion of Brazilian welfare state [ . . . ] The constitutional amendment 55 is an example of this.
They will cut pension rights, then the national health system, the federal university, etc.
[and] a new dictatorship is ready. (Student A, 28 April 2017, personal interview).
It is important to consider the strike as a demonstration against the new right-wing advance
in this country, a partisan judiciary, a government full of corrupt ministers, increasing
inequalities [ . . . ] This strike is against labor reform, but not only. Think about the real
disposal of public administration. (Public servant B, 28 April 2017, personal interview)
Even if the general strikes served mainly to protest against labor reform, other issues
are equally important and should be included in the political agenda of trade unions,
social movements, and the parties (especially PT and PC do B) that are taking part in the
strikes. For instance, interviewees underline the “state coup” of 2016 (the so-called
golpe):
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It is not just the strike. We are here also because of the golpe against the elected president
Dilma. Against this reactionary and fascist movement that organized the coup. For the rights
of black people, the LGTB movement, workers, teachers, public servants. (Student D, 28
April 2017, personal interview)
Throughout Brazil, trade unions and social movements such as the Frente popular
(Popular Front Brazil) and Povo sem medo (People’s Front without Fear), in addition to
student movements and organisations (UNE), sectors of the Catholic Church, and a
myriad of organisations, associations, and entities all over Brazil are protesting, forming
what the MCA suggests is a political block, antagonistic to one another:
Some right-wing organizations, for example the MBL, have connections with the country’s
business elite. And other conservative groups. There are even some fringe organizations
demanding outright military intervention [i.e. SOS Forc¸as Armadas], and others groups
[and think tanks such as] the Instituto Millenium, [ . . . ] influencers, and the media against
the PT. [ . . . ] We are here against these groups. We support the Sem Terra Movement, trade
unions and other groups in opposition to the Temer reforms. (Student E, 28 April 2017,
personal interview)
The general strike is unitarily convened by all the centrais. CUT is fundamental. We were
sleeping for too long. We have organized the protest movements and today we are here, at
the general strike, with many other groups and movements. So, we woke up. (CUT union
leader, 28 April 2017, personal interview)
The general strike in April, which was led by the main centrais, partially paralysed the
main capitals of Brazil: buses and trains did not circulate, roads and avenues were
blocked. For example, the subway lines were blocked in Sa˜o Paulo (Firmino, 2017).
According to the preliminary assessment of the general strike, a movement of never-
before-seen proportion had taken over the entire national territory, with hundreds of
categories crossing arms in the twenty-six states and the Federal District. In the orga-
niser’s estimation, between thirty-five and forty million workers stopped working
throughout the country – a phenomenon that could be considered the largest general
strike in history. Notwithstanding, “the government characterized the strike as a political
manifestation and minimized its endurance” (CSB union leader, 26 July 26 2017, per-
sonal interview).
After April’s success, why did the general strike of June then result in failure? As
already noted, the trade union agenda is both very rich and capable of aggregating
different players and issues. Such a form of mobilisation fosters a protest agenda, with
multiple social actors, organised in a political block: “it is not just a general strike”
(Student E, 28 April 2017, personal interview).
Moreover, “the media system does not help” (CUT union leader, 15 June 2017,
personal interview) because, as some interviewees suggest, it is partisan. On 29th April,
the main Brazilian newspapers (Folha de Sa˜o Paulo and O Estado de Sa˜o Paulo) spent
more time highlighting acts of vandalism than they did covering the peaceful protests
that took place all over Brazil. The mayor of Sa˜o Paulo, Joa˜o Doria, classified the strikers
as a minority of tramps, and the newspapers provided him ample evidence in support of
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this idea. The broadcaster, O Globo, defined the “strike” as a simple “protest”: “Globo
didn’t like to call the ‘strike’ with its proper name: ‘strike’” (CUT union leader, 15 June
2017).
The first general strike, on April 2017, garnered a significant amount of participation,
but the second, on June, ended with participating falling significantly below expecta-
tions. Despite the popular rejection of Temer’s mandate, a long list of scandals involving
the president and members of the executives, and the content of the law, in June, unions
were surprisingly unable to agree on a common strategy for dealing with the proposal of
labor reform. As interviews explained, there are several reasons as to why the June strike
was so disappointing: (1) different union approaches, cultures, and strategies that didn’t
favour the success of the strike; (2) the very structure of unions, which are divided into a
myriad of sindicatos and federac¸o˜es and organised in different forms and at different
levels, with diverging relations to the party system.
The strike of April 28 was considered a success: “trade unions were excited” (XXX
union leader, 16 June 2017, personal interview). At the beginning of June, the main
centrais (CGTB, CSB, CSP Conlutas, Central dos Trabalhadores and Trabalhadoras do
Brasil [CTB], CUT, Forc¸a Sindical, Intersindical, UGT) decided to convene a new
general strike, to take place on 30th June. Unfortunately, contrary to a previous
announcement, on 23rd June, the centrais gave up on calling the general strike and
released a note establishing a timetable for “mobilisations,” without using the term
“general strike”: “the general strike of April has had negative consequences, especially
within private companies” (XXX union leader, 16 June 2017, personal interview). It
weighed heavily on the decision of transport workers, especially those from Sao Paulo,
who would not stop working on the 30th:
[and] the Metropolitan workers of Sa˜o Paulo were punished with a loss of four days of
wages as a result of the strike of April 28 [ . . . ] Furthermore, it is not so simple to convince
all the workers, of all the categories, of all the sindicatos, affiliated to different federations
and confederations. There are also divisions among centrais, because of politics. You know.
The CUT, in turn, was against the impeachment of the former president Dilma and discards
any negotiation with the current illegitimate president. But the Forc¸a sindical is negotiating
with this government. Maybe the CUT announced the strike too soon, on the wave of the
April demonstrations [ . . . ] I also told to my companions: “We cannot convene another
general strike, in such a short time.” It’s too optimistic. (XXX union leader, 31 June 2017,
personal interview)
And if you lose your job? Who can you ask for help? Sindicatos? Which ones? The
trade unions affiliated with your company? Maybe. The centrais? If you lose your job,
you, just you, look for another one. Can local unions help you? I don’t think so. What
can they do? [ . . . ] The union movement? Brazil currently has 11,500 sindicatos. Who
contacts them all? Brazil has a duplicate structure of federations, confederations and
twelve trade union centrals [“centrais sindicais”]. To convene a general strike, all trade
unions, all centrais, must accept the general strike. If one central does not accept or
changes the idea, it is not a general strike [ . . . ]. It’s so simple. (CSB union leader,
26 July 2017, personal interview)
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Forc¸a Sindical and CUT together represent a little over just five million workers. For
an active population of eighty million, their representativeness does not even reach 7 per
cent.11 If organisational fragmentation was not enough, there are also political differ-
ences among trade unions. The representatives of only some centrais attended the
meetings with the government: the leaders of the Forc¸a sindical, UGT, Nova central
sindical and CBS. Faced with the possibility of negotiation, the Forc¸a sindical began to
assert that 30th June should be characterised as a national day of mobilisation, but not as
a strike. There are likewise divisions between various categories of workers: bankers,
affiliated with the CUT, defended adherence to the strike, but metropolitan workers did
not. “That is why the call for the strike was not unitary” (XXX union leader, 31 June
2017, personal interview).12
On 30th June, in Brasilia, in contrast to expectations, there was no record of
demonstrations in the region of the Ministries. Buses circulated in all capitals (the only
exceptions being Brasilia and Belo Horizonte). The best example of the failure of June’s
“general strike” occurred in Sa˜o Paulo, where the Metro, CPTM (Companhia Paulista de
Trens Metropolitanos) and buses worked normally throughout the day. Participation in
the 30th June general strike was far below that of April’s strike: “it was not a strike, but
sporadic demonstrations, only in the main capitals; the strike proved to be a failure”
(XXX union leader, 31 June 2017, personal interview).
Conclusions
Similar to other Latin American cases (Murillo, 2005: 15), the Brazilian trade union
movement is currently entangled with alternative political factions and divided among
different attitudes towards adopting labor reforms and between a confrontational acti-
vism – which is represented by the majority wing of trade unionism, organised around
the CUT – and a more cooperative attitude favouring negotiation with government
(which is represented by the Forc¸a sindical). In addition to political differences, it is also
necessary to take into account the union system’s configuration: such a fragmented
industrial relations system does not favour coordination among centrais and sindicatos
nor does it favour their collective action.
Labor reform arises from a right-wing political milieu: as such, it does not change the
basics of the Brazilian industrial relations system, which is organised on corporatist
principles of the forties. Once the Reform is in force, the union structure continues to be
based on one sindicato per economic activity and territorial ambit (i.e. the unicidade
sindical). Labor reform, however, reduces even more the scope of action of the trade
unions, eliminating forms of public funding.
In the polarisation illustrated by the MCA, there are some key distinctions: Depen-
dencies between the party system and trade unions do not favour the reorganisation of
labor relations. The CUT was the cornerstone of the PT electoral victories and favoured a
subsequent moderation of the CUT, in terms of conflict, towards the governments of
Lula and Dilma (Boito et al., 2015). As a consequence, the growth of other, smaller
centrais was natural: Some examples include Conlutas (which is more closely related to
the Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado, PSTU), Intersindical (which is more
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closely related to the Partido Socialismo and Liberdade, PSOL), CTB (which is more
closely related to the Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCdoB). In addition, it is important to
consider that a significant number of CUT leaders entered the ministries by means of
political co-optation and not just the ministry of labor. At the same time, as trade unions
enter the institutions, by means of “antipetismo,” they also lose trust, social credibility,
and the capacity for mobilisation (Boito et al., 2015).
The data show a clear polarisation with regard to the principal topics of the reform. On
the one hand, the struggle against the Temer government and the organisations that
represent the new Brazilian right-wing, and on the other, the support of trade unionism:
in any case, this was not enough to mobilise millions of people in June, as had been the
case in the April strike.
However, the respondents seem to implicitly accept the current trade union system: it
is the cultural and political frame, where workers, militants, students, and so on, can play
a role in social protest. Even if it is confusing, it is also an environment where a sense of
belonging develops, though it is evident that there is a risk of losing control over the
wider political process (a more inclusive labor reform, political reform, welfare reform, a
necessary reform of Brazilian institutions and federalism, etc.). Since the “golpe,” the
unions have lost their political frame of reference. Similarly, trade unions have failed to
realise a counterproposal to Temer’s labor reform and the debate regarding labor reform
proposals has been generally weak. All of this paints a rather confusing picture, one that
contains a scarcity of viable proposals and perspectives that could promote dialogue, in a
moment characterised by reduced welfare, possible recession, and profound political
change.
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Notes
1. The Consolidac¸a˜o das Leis Trabalhistas was promulgated by Getu´lio Vargas in 1943 and
represented the systematisation of the body of labor legislation written since 1930 (Cardoso,
2010).
2. In this case, the term “sindicato” is preferable to “trade union,” as suggested by Cook (2007:
60). Reference to “sindicatos” here means “worker sindicatos” at local or firm ambit. The term
“trade union” here refers to the workers’ union organisations: “sindicatos,” “federations,”
“confederations,” and the superordinate level of the “central sindical” (Boito, 1991; Da Silva,
2009).
3. Amendments were presented – and voted on – by MPs from the following parties: PMDB,
PSDB, PP, PTB, SD, PSD, PR and PPS, all from Michel Temer’s government base. On the
contrary, Partido dos Trabalhadores, Partido Socialismo and Liberdade, PCdB, and other
leftist parties rejected the reform.
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4. Besides the Consolidac¸a˜o das Leis Trabalhistas, Labor reform amends laws regulating tem-
porary work, the Guarantee Fund for length of service, and the organisation of the Brazilian
social security system. A detailed analysis of the reform and the presidential decree 808/2017
can be found in Krein (2018).
5. The “enunciados” can be reviewed on the following site, at http://www.jornadanacional.
com.br/listagem-enunciados-aprovados-vis2.asp? ComissaoSel¼7
6. More details on the sample and the main results of the opinion poll can be found in IPESA
(2017). The main results of the survey can be found in the final research report available at
http://cutrs.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Pesquisa-IPESA-CUT-para-Imprensa-01-06-
2017-1-1.pdf. The sample data were commissioned by Central U´nica dos Trabalhadores and
collected by the IPESA. A random probability sampling method is used, stratified into three
levels: 1. sex; 2. geographical area; 3. professional status.
7. Similar results related to the Brazilian case can be found in the Latinobaro´metro (i.e. an annual
public opinion survey that involves some 20,000 interviews in 18 Latin American countries):
only 5 per cent of respondents say they have “a lot” of trust in trade union organisations.
Latinobaro´metro online data analysis can be found at http://www.latinobarometro.org/
latOnline.jsp
8. “Trust in trade unions” [v6] and “Trust in CUT” [v7] are nominal: two categories, higher and
lower the average score of 0–10 scale.
9. Union leaders and activists were interviewed, mainly in Porto Alegre, from April to July 2017,
during the strikes or at the trade union headquarters. In total, twenty interviews were carried out.
10. The Michel Temer government began on 12 May 2016. The first major reform brought about
with the new country project was the tax regime, PEC 55, which provided for the constitu-
tional limitation of public spending for twenty years, a fact that is internationally unprece-
dented. This amendment makes it impossible for the state to comply with the obligations that
came into force in the 1988 Constitution. For a detailed analysis of Brazilian public spending,
see Kerstenetzky (2012: 207). The second great structural reform presented by Temer is Social
Security, which proposed a set of draconian changes in the rules of the system, with an
emphasis on increasing the minimum contribution – from fifteen to twenty-five years and
at least forty-nine years of work – required for an individual to begin taking advantage of the
benefit ratio.
11. For a more recent analysis on union density, see Souza and Zanlorenssi (2019).
12. The differences were expressed on Thursday (June 22) in the notes released by Forc¸a Sindical
and Central U´nica dos Trabalhadores, CUT. In the morning, Forc¸a Sindical issued a statement
directing its affiliates to carry out acts and demonstrations on their bases. In the afternoon, the
CUT released a note using the word “strike.” An excerpt of the note can be found here: https://
esquerdaonline.com.br/2017/06/23/urgente-centrais-sindicais-confirmam-greve-geral-no-
dia-30-de-junho/
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